Does Satisfaction with Democracy really increase Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland by Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle & Vatter, Adrian
ORI GIN AL PA PER
Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase
Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual
Satisfaction in Switzerland
Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen • Adrian Vatter
Published online: 10 May 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
Abstract This paper takes the influential ‘‘direct democracy makes people
happy’’-research as a starting point and asks whether direct democracy impacts
individual satisfaction. Unlike former studies we distinguish two aspects of indi-
vidual satisfaction, namely satisfaction with life (‘‘happiness’’) and with how
democracy works. Based on multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons we show
that the theoretical assumption on which the happiness hypothesis is based has to be
questioned, as there is very little evidence for a robust relationship between satis-
faction with democracy and life satisfaction. Furthermore, we do not find a sub-
stantive positive effect of direct democracy on happiness. However, with respect to
satisfaction with democracy, our analysis shows some evidence for a procedural
effect of direct democracy, i.e. positive effects related to using direct democratic
rights, rather than these rights per se.
Keywords Direct democracy  Satisfaction with democracy  Happiness 
Multilevel analysis
Introduction
In recent years much scholarly attention has been devoted to possible positive
effects of popular rights on citizens’ behaviour and attitudes. While, on the one
hand, most research has focused on direct democracy’s ‘‘educative effects’’ in terms
of increased political information, knowledge, and interest, and thus on the
functioning of democracy (Benz and Stutzer 2004; Bowler and Donovan 2002;
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Hero and Tolbert 2004; Lassen 2005; Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Smith 2002;
Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert et al. 2003; Tolbert and Bowen 2008), the
influential ‘‘direct democracy makes people happy’’ research initiated by Frey and
Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and Frey et al. (2001) stresses an even broader positive effect
of direct democracy, namely on a society’s general well-being.
In this paper, we ask whether direct democracy effectively and directly increases
citizens’ satisfaction with life as suggested by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and Frey
et al. (2001).1 We argue that the happiness hypothesis is based on the implicit
assumption that the positive relationship between direct democracy and life
satisfaction is an indirect one via the intervening variable of satisfaction with how
democracy works. This, however, is a rather strong assumption that needs some
clarification and empirical testing. The present article therefore addresses the following
questions: Does the theoretical fundament of the well-known happiness hypothesis
indeed hold? Is there really a close link between satisfaction with democracy and
general well-being? And, does direct democracy influence happiness with one’s life or
rather satisfaction with the political system in which an individual lives?
Our study goes beyond current research in three important respects. First, we
provide a more direct test of the association between democracy and happiness than
Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b) by incorporating a critical mediating variable in the
analysis: citizens’ evaluations of how democracy works. Although Frey and Stutzer
(2000a, p. 921) argue that democracy influences happiness both through higher
satisfaction with policy outcomes that are related to direct democracy and greater
involvement in political processes (i.e. a procedural effect), they do not directly
examine these conceptual linkages and so leave a critical step in their argument
untested. By contrast, we argue that, given the theoretical underpinning, satisfaction
with democracy must explicitly be integrated into the model when analysing the
relationship between direct democracy and general well-being. We therefore
assume that satisfaction with life and with democracy are related to each other, but
still form distinct aspects of overall satisfaction.
Second, we use a more elaborate operationalization of direct democracy which
better reflects the concept as it is used in the theoretical argument. Former studies
(e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2000a) conclude that the procedural effect of direct democracy
on happiness is most important: People become happier if they have the opportunity
to participate in direct democracy, and if they use that opportunity. While Frey and
Stutzer (2000a) investigate this aspect by comparing citizens of Swiss and foreign
nationality, we account for the procedural aspect of direct democracy by
distinguishing direct democratic rights (rules-in-form), i.e. the opportunity to
participate, and their actual use (rules-in-use), i.e. whether people actually make use
of these opportunities. If the relationship between direct democracy and individual
satisfaction is indeed procedural in nature, the latter variable measuring the actual
frequency of ballot measures in a canton should be the stronger factor in the model.
Third, our study uses a more appropriate research design for investigating the
impact of direct democracy on individual happiness. In the first place, data from the
1 Similar to Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) ‘‘satisfaction with life’’ is used here interchangeably with the
terms ‘‘happiness’’ and ‘‘subjective well-being’’.
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Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006 allows us to assess two very different forms of
satisfaction, namely life satisfaction and satisfaction with how democracy works. In
addition, we employ multilevel analysis to uncover the influence of direct
democracy, which is a distinguishing feature of the Swiss cantons, on citizens’
satisfaction with life and democracy, assessed at the individual level. Because
individuals are nested within cantons, it is essential to employ multilevel analysis to
avoid biased and inefficient estimates of the effects of democracy on satisfaction.
By contrast, Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b) treat this ‘‘clustering’’ of the data as a
nuisance which is corrected for by calculating robust standard errors. Dorn et al.
(2008, p. 233) apply an ‘‘unweighted random-effects ordered probit model’’, which
does not even allow for clustering at the contextual level. This is problematic, as
contextual effects are typically overestimated when the hierarchical data structure is
not accounted for.
Following the analyses by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c), Frey et al. (2001) and
Dorn et al. (2008) the units of investigations, thus, are the 26 Swiss sub-national
units, the cantons. The Swiss cantons indeed offer an excellent opportunity to assess
the influence of direct democracy on individual satisfaction; these sub-national units
exhibit considerable differences in the formal legal access to as well as in the use of
popular rights. Some cantons—mainly in the German speaking regions—have very
extensive direct-democratic procedures, while others—typically the French and
Italian speaking cantons—are more strongly oriented towards the type of
representative democracy with a restricted access to direct democratic instruments
(Feld and Savioz 1997, p. 511; Freitag and Vatter 2000; Ladner 1991; Linder 2005,
p. 272; Vatter 2002; Vatter and Freitag 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. To begin, the theoretical considerations and
hypotheses regarding the relationship between direct democracy, satisfaction with
democracy, and life satisfaction will be discussed. Next, we introduce the research
design, the method, and the variables. In ‘‘Empirical results’’ section, the hypotheses
will be subjected to the scrutiny of systematic statistical evaluation, based on a
quantitative comparison of the federal states of Switzerland—the cantons. This
article will then conclude with a brief discussion of the findings.
Theory and Hypotheses
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his ‘‘Contrat social’’ (1762) considered the Swiss the
happiest nation in the world since it had the strongest forms of direct democratic
participation at its disposal and was therefore able to take its political fate into its
own hands: ‘‘When we see among the happiest people in the world bands of
peasants regulating the affairs of state under an oak tree, and always acting wisely,
can we help feeling a certain contempt for the refinements of other nations, which
employ so much skill and effort to make themselves at once illustrious and
wretched?’’ (Of the Social Contract, Book IV, Chapter 1).
More than two hundred years later, Barber (1984) in his influential work ‘‘Strong
Democracy’’ argued in a quite similar way and suggested that direct democratic
participation would engage citizens and lead them to have a more positive
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perception of democracy. Obviously, it is an argument clearly in keeping with a
long-held tradition from classical democratic theory that citizen participation is not
just of value in and of itself, but it also promotes civic engagement and more
positive attitudes towards the political system and democratic processes.
Indeed, there are several arguments and earlier findings which support the
hypothesis that direct democratic institutions can be expected to raise citizens’
subjective well being and their satisfaction with how democracy works.2 First,
according to the institutional economics literature, direct democracy is an effective
instrument to discourage rent-seeking among public decision-makers and to solve
the principal-agent problem (Frey 1994). In this view, governments in modern
democracies pursue their own objectives rather than those of the majority of the
electorate. As a consequence, the actions of the agent (the government) need not
correspond to the interests of the principal (the majority of the governed), on behalf
of whom the agent ought to act. In representative democracies, the principal-agent
problem is solved by periodically recurring elections, which prevent interests from
diverging over a long period of time. In political systems with direct democratic
elements, there are further instruments of popular control in addition to elections,
namely referendums and initiatives which help to reduce the principal-agent
problem. Feld and Savioz (1997, p. 515), for example, argue that
if elements of direct democratic decision making ceteris paribus reduce the
principal agent problem compared with representative democracy without
inducing a lower level of information of the decision makers and if it enhances
competition in a society with political collusion, then the efficiency of government
activities should be higher in direct than in representative democracies.
Popular votes, thus, reduce the discretion of political decision-makers in the
period between elections and help to break self-interest oriented political cartels
(Frey 1994, p. 340ff.). As a consequence of the more direct participation rights of
the people, politicians are better controlled and monitored than in representative
systems and forced to follow the preferences of the median voter. Consequently,
governmental decisions and policy outputs are closer to the interests of the citizens,
and this should result in higher satisfaction with government and democracy.
Second, the institutions of direct democracy extend the citizens’ opportunities to
get involved in the political process. Experimental evidence (e.g. Bohnet and Frey
1999; Tyler 1990) demonstrates that this procedural effect is independent of the
governmental outcome itself. Both the opportunity to participate, as well as the act of
participation in policy decisions, can be expected to promote more positive views
about democracy (Bowler and Donovan 2002). This suggests that procedural utility of
direct participation in politics, in addition to its outcome utility, is an important source
of satisfaction with democracy. In fact, the utility gained from participation and
procedural fairness was found to be even larger than the utility gained from a
democratic political outcome (Stutzer and Frey 2003). This is in line with the empirical
2 In this context we also refer to the literature on other political determinants of individual satisfaction
with life and democracy, which are however not at the center of this paper (e.g. Andersen and Guillory
1997; Radcliff 2001).
538 Polit Behav (2012) 34:535–559
123
studies by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001, 2002) showing that people are often more
concerned about the processes by which government renders decisions (e.g. the
influence of interest groups) than the actual outcomes or policies themselves.3
Third, in a series of influential empirical studies, Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and
Frey et al. (2001) confirm the positive effect of direct democracy on people’s
satisfaction at the sub-national level in Switzerland. The authors used survey data in
which individuals reported their ‘‘subjective well-being’’, called ‘‘happiness’’ for short.
They consistently found that people living in Swiss cantons reported significant higher
levels of ‘‘happiness’’ when there was easier access to direct democratic institutions.4
As we argued earlier, however, although Frey and Stutzer suggest that direct
democracy influences happiness by improving individual satisfaction with the way
democracy works, they fail to examine the important mediating role of democratic
satisfaction. We argue that satisfaction with democracy must explicitly be integrated
into the analysis—both theoretically and empirically—when investigating the
relationship between direct democracy and general well-being.
In the worst case, the relationship found by Frey and its colleagues could be just a
statistical artifact. As former studies have shown, individual happiness is strongly
related to other aspects of contentment in general, and satisfaction with democracy
in particular (Graham and Pettinato 2001, p. 248). If direct democracy augments
satisfaction with democracy as the comments above suggest, and given a (strong)
correlation between the two facets of individual satisfaction, then omitting
satisfaction with democracy could very well produce a spurious relation between
direct democracy and happiness.
This latter view is in accordance with Veenhoven (2000, p. 4f.) who distinguishes
on the one hand between life chances and life results, i.e. opportunities to do well
and actual outcomes, and on the other hand between external and internal qualities
of life, i.e. the quality of the environment and of the individual situation.5 Adapting
his typology to the concept of satisfaction with democracy and individual happiness,
we can conclude that the two aspects are related, but still distinct phenomena.
Happiness as conceptualized by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) refers to the
individual, i.e. inner quality and to the outcome dimension—i.e. to ‘‘Appreciation of
life’’ or ‘‘Enjoying life’’ (Veenhoven 2000, p. 7, 2004, p. 13f.). Satisfaction with
democracy, in contrast, is much more related to the quality of the environment.
Moreover, this kind of satisfaction may be influenced by both opportunities and
outcomes (see also the discussion below). As a result, it corresponds best to what
Veenhoven (2000, p. 6, 2004, p. 5) calls ‘‘livability of environment’’.
3 However, according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) this does not mean that American citizens
want to be more strongly involved in political decision making. Contrary to the prevailing view whereby
people want greater involvement in politics, empirical results by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001, 2002)
as well as Hibbing and Alford (2004) show that a majority of American citizens do not care about politics
and do not desire a more direct voice in political decision making.
4 Recently, Dorn et al. (2008) re-evaluate the relation between direct democracy and subjective well-
being in Switzerland using new data from the Swiss Household Panel. In contrast to Frey and Stutzer
(2000a, b) they find that once language is controlled for, no robust significant relationship between the
extent of popular rights and life satisfaction can be observed.
5 Combining these two criterion Veenhoven (2000, p. 6) distinguishes four types of life quality, namely
‘‘Livability of the environment’’, ‘‘Life-ability of a person’’, ‘‘Utility of life’’, and ‘‘Appreciation of life’’.
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Regarding the happiness-hypothesis this typology has two consequences: Firstly,
satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction are indeed related to each other.
Most importantly, they both depend on the provision of needs and wants: Individual
satisfaction can be influenced by the context or the life situation and will therefore
vary over time and across contexts (Inglehart et al. 2008).6 Nevertheless, they refer
to very different ‘‘qualities of life’’ and will consequently be influenced by different
factors (Veenhoven 2000, p. 35). This perspective, second, lends support to our
argument that direct democracy is related to satisfaction with democracy, which
actually refers to the quality of the environment in which an individual lives.
Conversely, individual happiness may depend less on the institutional context, and
more on how well individual needs and wants are met, e.g. factors such as
individual social status and integration.
This discussion implies that the traditional happiness-hypothesis (Frey and
Stutzer 2000a, b, c; Frey et al. 2001), should be considered alongside two alternative
hypotheses.
The Traditional Happiness Hypothesis (H1): The more extensive direct
democracy in a canton is, the higher will be individual happiness.
The Indirect Happiness Hypothesis (H2):
(a) The more extensive direct democracy in a canton is, the higher will be citizen
satisfaction with democracy.
(b) The higher citizen satisfaction with democracy, the more satisfied people are
with their lives.
The Satisfaction with Democracy Hypothesis (H3): The more extensive direct
democracy in a canton is, the higher will be citizen satisfaction with democracy. In
contrast, individual happiness is not related to a canton’s direct democracy.
Figure 1 summarizes these expectations. The solid line represents H1 suggesting
a direct link between direct democracy and happiness, according to Stutzer and
colleagues. The dashed arrows stand for the indirect happiness hypothesis (H2),
whereby we do not postulate a direct effect of direct democracy on general well-
being, but rather an indirect effect via satisfaction with democracy. Finally, the
dotted arrows according to H3 imply that direct democracy is related to satisfaction
with democracy, but does not—neither directly nor indirectly—influence subjective
well-being.
As opposed to Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c), we account for the procedural aspect
of direct democracy by distinguishing between the formal availability of the
instruments of direct democracy (‘rules-in-form’) and the frequency of their actual use
in practice (‘rules-in-use’) (cf. Rothstein 1996, p. 146), assuming that the existence of
formal rights does not necessarily entail their usage (Vatter 2002). For example, the
number of ballot initiatives in the period 1990–2005 is highest in the cantons of Zurich,
Basle City, and Geneva, even though the formal conditions to launch a popular
6 This view varies from other perspectives that either perceive individual satisfaction as a biological
factor or a trait (Diener et al. 2003) or follow a social comparison approach (Easterlin 2003).
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initiative are more favorable in other cantons like Aargau, Basle Country, and
Nidwalden. In sum, not formal citizen’ rights alone should lead to political results that
are more likely to be acceptable to a large majority of the population, but citizens’
satisfaction with democracy may arise from their actual participation in the political
decision-making process and from the perceived extent of the procedural fairness of
this process: Ballot votes may produce the conditions for a discursive process
(Habermas 1992; Steiner et al. 2004) which is—unlike most other democratic
processes—open to the whole population. Studies in the Swiss context (e.g. Feld and
Kirchga¨ssner 2000, p. 289ff.) show that citizens in a direct-democratic environment
are better informed than their counterparts in a representative democracy. On the one
hand, they need this information in order to make their decision at the ballot, but on the
other hand, information is also necessary to participate in the dialogue with other
citizens. Moreover, the public discourse during a ballot campaign enhances citizens’
knowledge about different arguments for and against a particular decision. Finally, in
the Swiss direct democratic system, the role of money, does not receive the same level
of importance than in the US context. Kriesi (2009), for instance, finds the overall
relationship between campaign spending and the outcome of the vote to be very weak
in Switzerland. As a result, we can hypothesize that due to the direct democratic
process individuals will better accept the decision taken at the ballot—independently
of whether he or she voted in accordance with the final result—and feel more strongly
aligned with their community.
Given these arguments, we thus assume that the actual use of democratic rights
and less their formal availability influences individual satisfaction with democracy
and/or life (H4):
The actual use of direct democratic instruments (rules-in-use) is the stronger
predictor of individual satisfaction with democracy and/or life than the
institutional design of these instruments (rules-in-form).
Research Design, Method, Data and Variables
Following the discussion above we consider both satisfaction with democracy and
life satisfaction for our empirical model and simultaneously estimate how direct
democracy (and other controlling variables at the individual and contextual level)
impact on these aspects of satisfaction (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, applying a
Fig. 1 Multivariate model for the direct democratic influence on individual satisfaction. Note: Own
illustration
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multivariate multilevel statistical framework,7 we can implement a path model in
which satisfaction with democracy builds an explanatory factor into the model of
life satisfaction (according to H2). If the theoretical assumptions of the indirect
happiness hypothesis hold, we would expect to find a significant path from
satisfaction with democracy to life satisfaction.
Another advantage of this design is that the ‘‘covariance’’ between the two
variables on the individual and contextual level can be calculated. Not only can
distinct variance terms be estimated summarising the degree to which the two types
of satisfaction vary between cantons, but we can also calculate a ‘‘joint covariance’’
in order to assess how the two variables covary across the cantons (Subramanian
et al. 2005, p. 667). This provides us with further information on whether and which
of the hypotheses can best be supported by the empirical data. We use a Bayesian
estimation approach, which as been shown to perform better than maximum
likelihood, particularly when employing multilevel models with a small number of
level 2 units (Browne and Draper 2006).
Individual level data were obtained from the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006,
which is a telephone survey of the permanent resident population conducted by the
Swiss Society of Public Utility. The sample contains 5,565 respondents ages
15–92.8 We have two dependent variables, namely life satisfaction, which
corresponds to Frey and Stutzer’s (2000a, b, c) conception of happiness, as well
as satisfaction with democracy. For the measurement of these variables, answers to
the following questions from the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006 are considered:
– Life satisfaction: ‘‘Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life?
Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘very
unsatisfied’ and 10 means ‘very satisfied’?’’
– Satisfaction with democracy: ‘‘Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with
how democracy in Switzerland works? 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’, 10 means
‘very satisfied’?’’9
7 For a discussion of multilevel structural equation models see Hox and Maas (2004).
8 Of the 7,409 persons interviewed, 1,844 show missing values for the dependent and/or independent
variables and are therefore excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents per canton are as
follows: Zurich (896), Bern (669), Lucerne (254), Uri (73), Schwyz (117), Obwalden (62), Nidwalden
(83), Glarus (76), Zug (66), Fribourg (181), Solothurn (178), Basel-Town (166), Basel-Country (183),
Schaffhausen (89), Appenzell Outer Rhodes (76), Appenzell Inner Rhodes (71), St. Gall (290), Grisons
(132), Argovia (387), Thurgau (142), Ticino (244), Vaud (438), Valais (189), Neuchaˆtel (136), Geneva
(285), Jura (82).
9 Unfortunately, the question does not explicitly relate to the cantonal level. In the Swiss context, it can
however be assumed that individual perception of how democracy works in Switzerland is largely
influenced by the canton in which an individual lives. On the one hand, Switzerland is one of the most
decentralized countries in the world (Filippow et al. 2001), in which policy making largely occurs at the
cantonal level. Various authors, on the other hand, argue that this primacy of the canton transfers to
citizens’ perceptions. As Auer (1990, p. 15) states: ‘‘For the Swiss, the state is not the federation, but the
canton’’ (own translation). Similarly it is often argued that the Swiss Federation is just an emanation of
the cantons, in other words a ‘‘secondary or derivate body, a mere product of inter-cantonal agreements’’
(Germann and Klo¨ti 2004, p. 321). These arguments refer to the political, but also historic, symbolic and
emotional importance of the Swiss subnational units, which generally look back on a very long history
involving important identity-forming forces.
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In this context it must be mentioned that the concept of ‘‘satisfaction with
democracy’’ is not uncontested. As Canache et al. (2001) for instance demonstrate
the indicator captures multiple dimensions of political support, including system
support, support for authorities as well as support for democracy. While this
multidimensionality may be a problem mainly when comparing different countries
or developments over time, in our context it quite well corresponds to a perspective
according to which direct democracy is more than a pure systemic feature, but also
involves specific political processes and cultures.
For the measurement of the macro-level variables information from the
Comparative Cantonal Data Set (CCDS) is used. In order to measure direct
democracy, the institutional design of direct democratic instruments (rules-in-form)
as well as their use (rules-in-use) is integrated into the analysis. The former aspect
corresponds to the variable used by Dorn et al. (2008), Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c)
and Frey et al. (2001). This index of direct democratic rights in the Swiss cantons is
constructed to measure the barriers citizens encounter when entering the political
process. The barriers are in terms of the necessary signatures required to launch a
ballot measure (absolute and relative to the number of citizens with the right to
vote), the legally allowed timeframe in which to collect the signatures, and the level
of new expenditures per capita allowing a financial referendum. Each of these
restrictions is evaluated on a six-point scale: 1 indicates a high barrier (i.e. it is more
difficult to get a ballot measure on the ballot) and 6 a low one (i.e. it is quite easy to
get ballot measures on the ballot). To operationalize the rules-in-use we use the
average number of yearly cantonal ballot measures between 2000 und 2004.
In addition to our central explanatory variables, a series of potential relevant
factors from the macro and micro-levels should be considered as control variables.
In the choice of these variables we rely on the studies by Dorn et al. (2008), Frey
and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and Frey et al. (2001). On the individual level we integrate
the demographic variables age (in years and age squared), gender (male/female),
citizenship (foreigner/Swiss nationality), level of education (low, medium, high),
family situation (married/cohabiting versus single as well as whether a person has
children or not), and employment status. Moreover, economic indicators such as
household income and whether an individual is unemployed are incorporated. On
the contextual level the most important controlling variables include linguistic-
cultural background and the economic and fiscal situation in a canton (Dorn et al.
2008; Frey and Stutzer 2000a, b).10 Moreover and following Dorn et al. (2008) we
also include religious traditions. We use the values of the contextual factors
measured prior to each cantonal election to assure that the potential cause precedes
10 Dorn et al. (2008, p. 234) propose to account for individual cultural background in terms of language
spoken at home. As this information is not contained in our data set we do not consider this variable. In
order to account for the Dorn et al.’s (2008) finding whereby individual belonging to a language group is
the crucial aspects we measure cantonal linguistic culture not only in terms of regional dummies, but also
use the population share of German-speakers in a canton, which better capture linguistic culture and
heterogeneity in bilingual cantons like Fribourg, Berne or Valais. Further analyses not presented here
indeed show that the models including this variable better fits the data compared to a dummy
specification.
Polit Behav (2012) 34:535–559 543
123
the effect.11 More detailed information on the variables, operationalizations, and
sources can be found in the appendix.
Empirical Results
In this section, a three-stage procedure will be presented to examine the relationship
between direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy and life. In the first
analytical step, we make use of random intercept models that only include
individual variables in order to investigate how the two dependent variables relate to
each other and whether they are determined by similar or different mechanisms at
the individual level (Table 1). In the second step, the direct democracy variables
will be added to expand the model (Fig. 2). Finally, in a third step, the robustness of
the estimation will be tested by including further controlling variables, the linguistic
background among them, at the cantonal level (Figs. 4, 5).
Table 1 presents the individual level models. In Model 1 the identical individual
covariates are used to explain satisfaction with democracy and life simultaneously.
The separate coefficients for each of the dependent variables clearly demonstrate
that satisfaction with democracy and life are subject to different mechanisms at the
individual level. Only three variables impact happiness and satisfaction with
democracy in the same way: Lower education is accompanied with lower
satisfaction both with one’s life and with how democracy works. Moreover, while
satisfaction first decreases and then increases with age, having children does not
influence satisfaction with democracy or life.
For all other variables different effects on the two aspects of satisfaction can be
found: Men evaluate the functioning of democracy better than women, while the
contrary is true regarding life satisfaction. Married or cohabiting individuals are
more satisfied with both how democracy works and life, but the effect on the latter
variable is significantly stronger. A similar pattern can be observed regarding
unemployment: Unemployed persons are less happy with life and democracy, but
happiness in particular is negatively affected by unemployment. Belonging to a
denominational group increases satisfaction with democracy, the credible interval
for this variable however includes zero regarding happiness. Moreover, high
political interest more strongly enhances satisfaction with democracy than with life.
Finally, we find again opposing relationships between citizenship and satisfac-
tion: While foreigners are more satisfied with the way democracy works in
Switzerland than Swiss citizens, they tend to be less happy with their lives. This
finding is of particular interest if contrasted with the results by Frey and Stutzer
(2000a, b, c) and Frey et al. (2001). The authors argue that foreigners do not become
happier in a direct democratic context, since they are not integrated into the political
process and will therefore not be able to profit from direct democracy’s procedural
effects. Given our findings, whereby foreigners are indeed less satisfied with life,
but in fact more satisfied with democracy, their conclusion must be questioned. We
11 We refrain from integrating further institutional aspects such as local autonomy (Frey and Stutzer
2000a).
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rather have to conclude that foreigners—due to their non-inclusion—have a less
differentiated, and thus probably a more stylized, positive view of how democracy
in Switzerland works.12
What also follows from Model 1 is that the covariance between life satisfaction
and satisfaction with democracy is positive and significant at the individual level,
meaning that individuals who are satisfied with democracy also tend to be happier.
Still, the correlation is quite limited amounting to only 0.09. In contrast, the
covariance between cantons does include zero, which implies that cantons with high
mean satisfaction with democracy do not exhibit a substantially higher average
happiness. From these findings we can conclude that there is some relation between
satisfaction with democracy and with life, but it is rather limited.
In model 2, satisfactions with democracy and with life are modelled in a path
model, suggesting that the two indicators are not just correlated with each other, but
that the former influences the latter (thus, the fundament of H2). The estimations
show that satisfaction with democracy contributes to a higher overall well-being.
The inclusion of this path in the structural model, however, does not significantly
improve the model, which can be seen from the fact that the deviance is only
marginally reduced.13
From this first step of analysis the following conclusions can be drawn: First, it
is reasonable to perceive happiness and satisfaction with democracy as two
correlated phenomena, i.e. two aspects of a broader concept of individual
satisfaction. In contrast, there is no evidence for a very close relationship or even
causality between them. This lends support to the idea that happiness and
satisfaction with democracy refer to quite different ‘‘qualities of life’’ (Veenhoven
2000) which are moreover ‘‘produced’’ by different mechanisms. The theoretical
assumption on which the indirect happiness hypothesis (H2) is based therefore
occurs to be weak. Second, when testing the happiness hypothesis it is important
to apply a bivariate response model. Given the significant covariance between
satisfaction with democracy and with one’s own life, a single response model that
neglects the former would possibly lead to biased results regarding the latter: If
direct democracy is related to satisfaction with democracy, but not to happiness—
as suggested in our hypothesis H3—ignoring satisfaction with democracy may
overestimate the direct democratic effect due to the correlation between
satisfaction with democracy and with life.
Next, we proceed by integrating the central cantonal characteristics into the
model, namely direct democracy. More precisely, we want to simultaneously test
12 This suggestion is supported by further analyses not shown, in which a Dummy is included taking the
value of one if foreigners are allowed to vote at the cantonal level. (This applies to only two cantons: Jura
since 1978 and Neuchaˆtel since 2000). It can be seen from these models that cantons allowing foreigners
to participate in the political process exhibit less satisfaction in democracy than cantons that exclude
foreigners. Also, this effect does not substantially differ between Swiss and foreign citizens.
13 In further estimations not presented here, the opposite direction of the path, leading from life
satisfaction to satisfaction with democracy, has also been tested and proved to be of similar size than the
one shown in model 2. Overall, this further corroborates our previous finding whereas individual
satisfaction with democracy and with life must be seen as correlated concept—maybe even reinforcing
each other to a certain extent (Graham and Pettinato 2001, p. 255)—but that we cannot speak of causality
between them.
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whether the direct democratic context indeed influences satisfaction with life or
whether the effects found in earlier studies were only due to the correlation between
happiness and satisfaction with democracy. In so doing and in accordance to
hypothesis H4, we distinguish between direct democratic rights (rules-in-form) and
the actual use of direct democracy (rules-in-use). Figure 2 presents the estimated
effect of these direct democracy-indicators on individual satisfaction (see also
Appendix Table 3). The individual level variables—although included in all
models—are not shown for the sake of clarity and since these effects are highly
consistent to those shown in Table 1.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the rules-in-form positively influence both life
satisfaction and satisfaction with democracy, whereby the 90% credible interval in
the latter case however just includes zero. Moreover, when measuring direct
democracy by means of the actual use of direct democratic rights, thus taking into
account the procedural aspects, we find a positive effect on satisfaction with
democracy only, but not regarding overall well-being. Even without the inclusion of
linguistic culture, which proved to be the ‘‘elk test’’ for the direct democracy
variable in the Dorn et al. (2008) study, the simultaneous modelling of both
satisfactions with democracy and life satisfaction leads to ambiguous direct
democracy effects.
We argue that these results provide preliminary support for the theoretical
argument that direct democracy—if at all—impacts satisfaction with democracy but
not life satisfaction (H4). This conclusion needs some explanation with reference to
the two direct democracy indicators. As Fig. 3 initially shows, rules-in-use and
rules-in-form are only little correlated (left plot). Cantons with easy access to direct
democratic instruments tend to exhibit a more intense use of these instruments, but
the correlation is not substantially different from zero (Correlation = 0.29 [95%
Confidence interval: -0.11–0.61]). Second, while the rules-in-form variable is
highly correlated with linguistic culture (middle plot: 0.82 [0.63–0.92]), this is much
less the case regarding rules-in-use (right plot, 0.19 [-0.21–0.54]). This means that
while the effect of direct democratic rights on individual satisfaction may be
strongly influenced by the inclusion of linguistic culture due to multicollinearity (or
Fig. 2 Direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy and life. Note: Multivariate response
multilevel models; posterior mean and 90% credible interval of the direct democratic variable presented.
All models control for individual level effects as shown in Table 1 and are based on Bayesian estimation
(50,000 iterations, burn-in: 5,000; diffuse priors (gamma priors); no signs of non-convergence)
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in other words is subject to an omitted variable bias in Fig. 2), this should be less so
with regards to the use of direct legislation.
In the last step and following Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) as well as Dorn et al.
(2008) we therefore further integrate linguistic culture, religious culture and
economic performance into the models (Figs. 4, 5, see also Appendix Tables 4 and
5 for the complete models). In accordance with Dorn et al. (2008) language region is
the strongest of these variables, whereby respondents in the German-speaking part
of Switzerland are more satisfied both with democracy and with their lives. High
financial power as well as a catholic culture in a canton also tend to increase
satisfaction with how democracy works, while these controls are not at all related to
individual happiness. We estimated a series of models including different
combinations of these variables. As the choice of variables obviously influences
the marginal effects of direct democracy, the posterior means and 90% credible
interval for the direct democracy indicators are shown for each model.
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that our findings with regards to the relationship
between direct democracy and happiness are now even more conservative than
those presented by Dorn et al. (2008). In none of the 12 models do we find a
substantive and positive effect of direct democracy on happiness. If we consider the
direct democratic process (Fig. 5)—which according to Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b)
is central to the happiness hypothesis—the mean effect is even slightly negative.14
Concerning satisfaction with democracy the mean effect of direct democracy
is—not surprisingly—also weakened and even turns slightly negative when
including the controlling variables. This is particularly the case when direct
democracy is operationalized in terms of rules-in-form being strongly correlated
with language region. But in view of Fig. 5 we can conclude, that even if linguistic
culture, Catholicism and financial power are controlled for, there is a positive
relationship between the use of direct democratic instruments and satisfaction with
democracy. The densities of the direct democracy parameter in these six models are
largely on the positive side, meaning that with a high probability of roughly 90%
frequent ballot measures in a canton are associated with a better perception of how
Fig. 3 Relationship between linguistic culture and direct democracy. Note: Scatter plot and fitted
bivariate regression line
14 The inclusion of direct democracy completely explains the cantonal differences in happiness in the
models presented in Fig. 2. In the following models (Figs. 4, 5) the random intercept at the cantonal level
is therefore omitted in the happiness equation.
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democracy works. In two out of six models regarding the rules-in-use the 90%
credible interval does clearly not contain zero, while in other two (controlling for
both a canton’s financial power and Catholicism) it only just includes this value.
We, thus, find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the use of direct
democracy increases satisfaction with democracy (according to H3 and H4,
respectively). This effect is not negligible: A change from 1 to 12 ballot measures
per year, which corresponds to the variance observed among the Swiss cantons,
increases the average evaluation of the political process by roughly 0.4 (if linguistic
culture is measured by means of a regional dummy) and 0.5 (when the linguistic
composition of the population is accounted for) respectively. This effect (almost)
doubles standard deviation in satisfaction with democracy, which amounts to 0.28.
Finally, the comparison of the deviance information criterion furthermore shows
(not presented here) that the inclusion of the controlling variables does not
significantly improve model fit—even though they obviously influence the effect of
direct democracy. This finding points again to the main problem of the analysis
whereby the cantonal political, cultural and economic characteristics are highly
correlated and are difficult to disentangle. It comes to no surprise that the language
Fig. 4 Rules-in-form—full contextual models. Note: Multivariate response multilevel models, posterior
mean and 90% credible interval of the direct democratic variable given various combinations of controls.
All models control for individual level effects as shown in Table 1 and are based on Bayesian estimation
(50,000 iterations, burn-in: 5,000; diffuse priors (gamma priors); no signs of non-convergence)
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variables prove to be the strongest variables in the models: These indicators not only
capture cultural and political differences between the cantons, but also societal and
structural aspects (e.g. family networks, social capital, unemployment; see Freitag
2004; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2009).15 In this context and when measuring
direct democracy, the rules-in-use variable has important advantages, as this
indicator is much less correlated to other cantonal characteristics, particularly to
language region, than the rules-in-form.
Conclusions
Are citizens in strong democracies with highly developed direct democratic
institutions and frequent ballot use more satisfied with their democratic system and
their life than those in more representative democracies? This research question has
Fig. 5 Rules-in-use—full contextual models. Note: Multivariate response multilevel models, posterior
mean and 90% credible interval of the direct democratic variable given various combinations of controls.
All models control for individual level effects as shown in Table 1 and are based on Bayesian estimation
(50,000 iterations, burn-in: 5,000; diffuse priors (gamma priors); no signs of non-convergence)
15 It could also be argued that direct democracy differently affects individual satisfaction depending on
the linguistic, i.e. cultural context. Further models not presented including an interaction between
linguistic diversity and direct democracy however revealed that the relationship between direct
democracy and individual satisfaction in Switzerland does not substantially vary between different
linguistic environments.
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been investigated with respect to the 26 Swiss cantons which offer a unique
opportunity to quantify and compare the effects of direct democracy. Whereas
previous studies by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and Frey et al. (2001) based on
Swiss data from 1992 find striking results in that a higher formal degree of direct
democracy significantly increases happiness of the people, Dorn et al. (2008) in a
recent analysis cannot confirm such a relationship. The aim of our study was first
and foremost to advance the existing research theoretically, conceptually and
empirically. While Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c), Frey et al. (2001) as well as their
challengers Dorn et al. (2008) implicitly rely in their theoretical assumptions on
satisfaction with democracy, they fail to integrate this important concept into their
empirical analysis. Thus, in contrast to these previous studies we explicitly
incorporated satisfaction with democracy into our hypotheses as well as the
empirical models to analyse the relationship between direct democracy and
individual satisfaction. Moreover, by distinguishing direct democratic rights (rules-
in-form) and their actual use (rules-in-use) we used a more elaborated operation-
alization of direct democracy which better suits the central theoretical argument that
the procedural effect of direct legislation on satisfaction is most important. Lastly,
new data from the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006 allowed us to employ multilevel
analysis and thus a more suitable method given the research question at hand.
Based on multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons we conclude that the
theoretical assumption on which the traditional happiness hypothesis (Frey and
Stutzer 2000a, b, c) is based can be questioned, as there is no evidence for a very close
relationship between satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with life (happi-
ness) or even for causality between them. Moreover, when simultaneously modeling
the effect of direct democracy on different aspects of satisfaction, no empirical support
for the traditional happiness hypothesis can be found. Thus, a main result of our study
is that there is no evidence for a causal relationship between direct democracy and
overall well-being. In particular, satisfaction with democracy and with life must be
seen as two distinct, though correlated phenomena (see Veenhoven 2000), rendering
the theoretical argument of the traditional happiness hypothesis weak.
In contrast, there is some support for the first core element of the happiness
hypothesis, namely that extensive direct democracy is associated to higher
satisfaction with democracy. This relationship however only holds when measuring
direct democracy by means of the actual use of direct legislation, thus taking into
account the procedural utility. This confirms our initial assumption that given the
theoretical argument the use of direct democratic instruments is the better indicator
of direct democracy: People living in political systems that use more initiatives and
referendums tend to have slightly more positive views of how democracy works and
look a bit more favourably on the functioning of their political system. These
findings strengthen our central argument that direct democracy has a positive impact
on satisfaction with democracy but not on life satisfaction.
While our results regarding subjective well-being are opposed to a series of
previous analyses by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, b, c) and Frey et al. (2001) in which
they consistently found that direct democracy is a statistically significant positive
determinant of happiness, our conclusion is of course in line with the recent study
by Dorn et al. (2008) showing that direct democracy does not affect general well-
Polit Behav (2012) 34:535–559 551
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being in Switzerland. Our reasoning is different though: It is not primarily the
inclusion of linguistic culture that lets the direct democratic effect vanish and thus
the question of statistical robustness of the empirical results, but rather a more
appropriate theoretical model that explicitly integrates both crucial parts of the
happiness hypothesis.
In the last decade, a new line of research has commenced about the merits of
direct democracy in fields other than specific public choices. Scholars have begun
examining whether direct democratic processes have beneficial consequences in
areas such as civic engagement and political trust. In a short period of time, a lot of
empirical evidence has been presented indicating that greater use of direct
democracy leads to higher voter turnout (Smith and Tolbert 2004), increased citizen
interest in, and greater knowledge about politics (Smith 2002; Mendelsohn and
Cutler 2000; Tolbert et al. 2003), better informed citizens (Benz and Stutzer 2004)
and enhanced sense of political efficacy (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Hero and
Tolbert 2004; Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000, but see Dyck and Lascher 2009). In
sum, such findings confirm earlier statements of prominent advocates of the
participatory democracy theory, in particular Pateman’s argument (1970, p. 25) that
‘‘the more the individual citizen participates the better able he is to do so’’ as well as
Barber’s (1984, p. 284) assumption ‘‘the referendum can (…) provide a permanent
instrument of civic education’’. In this line of research we can now add a further
aspect, namely that the frequent use of direct democracy tends to be related to
higher satisfaction with democracy and in this sense strengthens citizens’
confidence in government responsiveness. However, at the same time, our findings
are in accordance with recent studies from the U.S. and Swiss context challenging
this overly optimistic view of direct democracy and casting some serious (both
empirical and theoretical) doubts on this line of reasoning (Dyck 2009; Dyck and
Lascher 2009; Dyck and Seabrook 2010; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010;
Schlozman and Yohai 2008). As the results regarding individual life satisfaction
show, direct democratic participation is not a panacea for everything: In this vein,
subjective well-being is first and foremost an individual feature, which cannot be
explained by politico-institutional factors such as direct democracy.
Finally, our analysis of direct democracy is presented with the understanding that
the results are based on specific data for Switzerland. Additional research using
large surveys and representative samples from different cultural contexts (e.g. US
states) and robust statistical modelling, including multi-level frameworks, is
necessary to shed more light on this important issue.
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See Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
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Table 2 Hypotheses, operationalization and sources
Variable Summary statistics Operationalization/sourcea
Dependent variables
Life satisfaction Mean: 8.09
SD: 1.70
Min.: 0
Max.: 10
Life satisfaction measured on a scale from 0 to 10, obtained
from responses to the following question: Generally
speaking, how satisfied are you with your life? Where
would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means ‘‘very unsatisfied’’ and 10 means ‘‘very satisfied’’?
Satisfaction with
democracy
Mean: 6.27
SD: 1.95
Min.: 0
Max.: 10
Satisfaction with democracy measured on a scale from 0 to
10, obtained from responses to the following question:
Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with how
democracy in Switzerland works? 0 means ‘‘not at all
satisfied’’, 10 means ‘‘very satisfied’’
Independent variables—individual level
Sex Shares:
Men: 42.19
Women: 57.81%
Dummy: 0 = women; 1 = men
Age Mean: 47.76
SD: 16.67
Min.: 15
Max.: 92
Age (in years) of the persons interviewed
Age squared (in years) of the persons interviewed
Foreigner Shares:
Swiss citizen: 87.13%
Foreigner: 12.87%
Dummy: 0 = Swiss nationality; 1 = foreigner
Educational level Shares:
Low education: 14.88%
Medium education:
53.53%
High education: 31.59
Highest completed level of education, three categories: low
educational achievements (secondary level I), middle
educational achievements (secondary level II), high
educational achievements (tertiary level)
Civil status Shares:
Married/cohabiting:
49.96%
Single: 50.04%
Dummy: 0 = single, widowed, divorced; 1 = married,
cohabiting
Children Shares:
Children: 19.39%
No children: 80.61%
Dummy: 0 = no school-aged children; 1 = school-aged
child/ren
Income Mean: 2.95
SD: 1.46
Min.: 1
Max.: 7
Seven categories ranging from fewer than 3,000 CHF to
over 15,000 CHF per month
Unemployment Shares:
Unemployed: 2.93%
Not unemployed: 97.07%
Dummy: 1 = unemployed; 0 = not unemployed
Religion Shares:
Non-denominational:
13.87%
Denominational : 86.13%
Dummy: 0 = has a denomination; 1 = undenominational
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Table 3 Estimated means and standard deviation of models as shown in Fig. 2
Mean SD 5% 95% DIC
Rules-in-form
SD 0.058 0.041 -0.008 0.126 44120
H 0.091 0.026 0.050 0.134
Rules-in-use
SD 0.033 0.017 0.004 0.060 44127
H -0.006 0.015 -0.031 0.018
Note: Multivariate response multilevel models, posterior mean of the direct democratic variable (standard
deviation in brackets) and 90% credible interval. All models control for individual level effects as shown in
Table 1 and are based on Bayesian estimation (50,000 iterations, burn-in: 5,000; diffuse priors (gamma priors);
no signs of non-convergence). Bold Credible interval does not contain zero (systematic relationship)
SD dependent variable ‘‘satisfaction with democracy’’, H dependent variable ‘‘individual happiness’’
Table 2 continued
Variable Summary statistics Operationalization/sourcea
Political interest Mean: 5.44
SD: 2.66
Min.: 0
Max.: 10
Political interest, on a scale from 0 (not at all interested) to
10 (very much interested)
Independent variables—contextual level
Degree of direct
democracy
Mean: 3.89
SD: 1.19
Min.: 1.75
Max.: 5.69
Index of direct democracy, 2003 (Vatter et al. 2009) based
on Stutzer and Frey (2000) and Stutzer (1999), higher
values indicate more direct citizen participation
Use of direct
democracy
Mean: 4.13
SD: 2.32
Min.: 0.6
Max.: 11.5
Number of cantonal ballot measures per year. Mean value
2000–2004 (Anne´e politique suisse, various years)
Language dummy Shares:
Latin cantons: 27.94%
German-speaking
cantons: 72.06%
Dummy: 1 = German-speaking canton; 0 = Latin canton
(based on Federal Statistical Office: population census
2000)
German-speakers in
%
Mean: 64.71
SD: 34.22
Min.: 3.9
Max.: 93.5
Share of German-speakrs in a canton (based on FSO 2000;
population census 2000)
Catholicism Mean: 43.42
SD: 20.52
Min.: 16
Max.: 85.8
Proportion of Catholics in the cantonal population (Federal
Statistical Office: population census 2000)
Financial power Mean: 97.18
SD: 43.54
Min.: 30
Max.: 227
Index of cantonal financial power (Gesamtindex der
Finanzkraft) calculated based on the indicators
‘‘aggregate income’’, ‘‘fiscal power’’, ‘‘tax load’’ and
‘‘montane area’’, 2005 (www.badac.ch)
a All individual variables are taken from the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006
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